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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No.
8828

JACK KEELEY,
Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 24th of October, 1957, the defendant was convicted in the District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
of the crime of Assault with Intent to Commit Rape.
At the time of the commission of the offense the prosecutrix was 10 years of age and the defendant was the girl's
stepfather. At the trial only the prosecutrix and the defendant testified. Testimony of the girl's school teacher taken
at the preliminary hearing was admitted. The errors raised

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

on appeal relate to the Court's permitting an adult to sit
near the prosecuting witness when she testified, and to the
exclusion of certain evidence.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT
TO PERMIT AN ADULT PERSON TO SIT
NEAR THE PROSECUTING WITNESS WHILE
THE LATTER TESTIFIED.

POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING
A MOTION TO STRIKE TESTIMONY OF THE
DEFENDANT RELATING TO A PHONE CONVERSATION WITH THE MOTHER OF A
FRIEND OF THE PROSECUTING WITNESS.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT
TO PERMIT AN ADULT PERSON TO SIT
NEAR THE PROSECUTING WITNESS WHILE
THE LATTER TESTIFIED.
At the commencement of trial the Court over objection
permitted a Mr. Egginton, an adult person, acquainted
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with the prosecuting witness, to sit near her while she
testified, she being a 10 year old girl.
The following from pages 25 and 26 of the transcript is
quoted:
"MR. RONNOW: I will have Mr. Don Egginton, an employee of the Salt Lake City School System to stand by her, or sit by her on the witness
stand.
"MR. BARCLAY: I object to that. I object to
him even being in the court.
"THE COURT: I am going to permit the man
to sit over here with the understanding he will say
nothing to the child or make no indication as to any
answers that are to be given, merely for that purpose and because of the child's age.
"MR. BARCLAY. All right, your Honor."
It is submitted that appellant's point falls on either
of the following two grounds: First, counsel for the defendant at trial waived his objection to the adult being seated
near the witness. It is noted from the above quoted portion
of the transcript that an initial objection was made, but
then after the Court allowed Egginton to sit near the witness, counsel said, "All right, your Honor." He thereby
consented to the Court's ruling and waived his original
objection.

Second, the Court's ruling did not constitute error.
The record does not reveal the exact position of Mr. Egginton with relation to the witness. However, the following
information was obtained from conversing with the District Attorney, Mr. Rannow, from Mr. Barclay, defendant's
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counsel at trial and from Mr. Egginton. Trial was had in
the Honorable Judge Stewart Hansen's Courtroom and
there the witness chair is elevated several feet above the
floor level. At the time the prosecuting witness testified
Mr. Egginton was seated in a chair on the floor level to
the left and slightly to the rear of the witness. Estimates
vary as to the distance between the witness and the adult
from 3 to 6 feet. The witness could not see Egginton unless
she turned her head to the extreme left.
The only case we ha.ve been able to find presenting a
similar factual circumstance is Evers v. State (1909 Neb.),
121 N. W. 1005. The full statement by the Supreme Court of
Nebraska discussing the problem there is quoted in appellant's brief on pages 8 and 9. There the prosecuting witness in a rape conviction was a girl eight years of age.
Over objection the trial court permitted an adult woman, (a
Mrs. Wheeler) a friend of the child, to sit on the stand while
the child testified. It appears that the adult was seated about
6 inches from the witness. It is interesting to note that in the
Evers case counsel objected that the adult woman was
prompting the witness. The trial court overruled the objection but cautioned that she was not to suggest. The appellate
court found no error for the reason that there was nothing
in the record to indicate "that Mrs. Wheeler ever again if
she had previously, disregarded the admonition of the
court." There is no indication in the instant case that Mr.
Egginton ever suggested or prompted the witness. Here the
objection merely goes to the presence of the adult near the
witness.
An earlier Nebraska case, although not so similar
factually as is the Evers case, bears on this problem. In
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Gould v. State (1904 Neb.), 99 N. W. 541, a conviction for
child stealing, the defendant assigned error because the
father of the child, a girl 15 years of age, was permitted
to sit near the child facing her when she testified. Defendant alleged that this was prejudicial. The Court affirming the conviction found no error on the ground that there
was no showing that the father's conduct was improper or
that the testimony of the daughter was in any way affected
by the father's presence.
Here there has been no showing that the presence of
Egginton influenced the testimony of the prosecuting witness, or that Egginton in any way attempted to coach or
prompt the witness. The Court permitted the seating arrangement because of the child's age and with the understanding that the adult would say nothing to the child.
Appellant accepts the principal of the Evers case, supra,
but seeks to distinguish the instant case with the argument
that the adult here was the first person to whom the child
revealed the incident. That contention does not have substantial merit. The child was undoubtedly frightened and
nervous and it may not have been possible to ellicit her
testimony unless someone was seated near her. This was
likely this child's first experience in a court proceeding.
Testifying at a trial is often a frightening experience even
for an adult; it would be more upsetting to a 10 year old
girl. The presence near her of an adult with whom she
was acquainted gave her sufficient confidence and selfassurance to speak. Appellant contends that the presence
of Egginton prompted the child to make her testimony
consistent with the description of the incident as she had
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related it to him, earlier. But this assumes that her testimony was false. Most every witness who testifies at trial
has related his story to someone (usually one of the attorneys) prior to the time of the trial and there is always
the desire to be consistent. The logical result of applying
appellant's argument would be to bar every person from the
courtroom who had previous to trial heard the witness'
story. It is submitted that whether the adult is seated
near the witness on the stand, or on the front row of the
courtroom benches is not significant.
In a recent case, Robinson v. State (1953 Ala.), 71 S. 2d
843, the Court of Appeals of Alabama, spoke of the trial
court's discretionary powers to deal with circumstances of
the nature before the Court here. That was a conviction
for carnel knowledge, and while a 7 year old boy, a brother
of the prosecutrix, was testifying, there was some indication that the boy's father seated in the courtroom was
signaling answers to the boy by nodding his head each time
a question was asked. The Court denied error and said at
page 845:
"In situations such as is here presented it is
well settled that since the trial court had the opportunity to see and hear everything that transpired,
of necessity, much must be left to his sound discretion and his rulings will not be disturbed unless
it clearly appears that such discretion has been
abused."
The above cited rule may be well applied to this case.
The trial court saw the circumstance at first instance; he
was able to observe the attitude and reaction of the young
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girl and he was able to observe whether the adult attempted
to influence or direct the answers of the witness. There
was no showing that he had done so.

POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING
A MOTION TO STRIKE TESTIMONY OF THE
DEFENDANT RELATING TO A PHONE CONVERSATION WITH THE MOTHER OF A
FRIEND OF THE PROSECUTING WITNESS.
On pages 72 and 73 of the transcript it is shown that
at a point during trial the District Attorney moved that
testimony as to a certain phone call be stricken. The Court
granted the motion. Appellant argues that this constituted
error. The objection and motion to strike came during
the direct examination of defendant; counsel was seeking
to show by relating specific instances that the prosecuting
witness had a past history of lying. Defendant had been
testifying of various instances when the young girl had
told falsehoods. The following, quoted from the transcript
at pages 72 and 73, during the direct examination of defendant, reveals the nature of the objection: (Ruth is the
Prosecutrix.)
"A. A telephone call came from, well, from
the mother of a little girl.
"Q. Don't tell what she said. Did you talk to
your little girl about what this lady had said to you?
"A. I don't believe I quite understood your
question, sir.
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"Q. Did you talk to the little girl?
"THE COURT: To Ruth.
"Q. (By Mr. Barclay) To Ruth about what
this lady had said to you about the birthday party?
"A. Yes.

What did you say to her, to Ruth?
"MR. RONNOW: I object on the grounds this
line of questioning is incompetent, irrelevant and
immaterial. Rather, this is not impeachment, and
this man cannot attack the truth-telling qualities of
this child by specific instances, none of these episodes
here that he was setting up in cross-examination.
It is improper impeachment.
"Q.

"MR. BARCLAY: I am not trying to impeach
anybody. I am just trying to tell the truth. This
is the evidence.
"MR. RONNOW: Not about a birthday party;
not about a phone call.
"THE COURT: Yes.
"MR. RONNOW: Did he ask her on cross-examination about a phone call?
"THE COURT: About a birthday party.
"MR. RONNOW: What about a phone call?
"THE COURT: Yes, sir.
"MR. BARCLAY: I think I did, because I had
this list here and went down it.
"THE COURT: I know he asked her about a
birthday. I don't think the phone call is the important thing, but I think it is proper so far as it relates to the birthday party.
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"MR. RONNOW: I have no memory of any
cross-examination on the phone call. I move that
be stricken as improper impeachment.
"THE COURT:
part."

That may be stricken, that

Previous to this discussion the defendant testified of other
instances when the prosecuting witness had related false
stories.
It is noted that as to the other instances of lying related by the defendant, the prosecuting witness had been
cross-examined, but as to the instance of the telephone call
there had been no cross-examination by defendant's counsel at trial. The District Attorney's objection was on the
basis that it was not proper to attack the truth-telling
qualities of this child by evidence of specific instances. Appellant argues in his brief that the admission of the defendant's testimony regarding specific instances of lying by
the prosecuting witness is proper whether or not the witness was cross-examined relative to the instances. It is
submitted that such is not the rule. The following is quoted
from Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 12th Edition, Section
931.

"The impeaching testimony must be confined to
the general reputation of the witness or to the relevant trait of character, and proof of specific acts
will not be received."
And from Section 927, the following:
"A witness may be discredited by evidence attacking his character or reputation for truth, even
though evidence has not been given to sustain the
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reputation. Proof of particular instances of untruthfulness is not admissible." (Emphasis supplied.)
For support of the rule, see Rau v. State (1919 Md.), 105
Atl. 867.
Appellant on page 17 of his brief refers to Wigmore's
attitude that so far as a woman-complainant of a sex-offense
charge is concerned an exception should be made admitting
evidence of specific instances of misconduct. But it is noted
that after suggesting such a rule Wigmore concedes that:

"* * * By most courts no exception is made
for this type of witness."
See Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Edition, Section 979 ( 4).

It is submitted that in any event the exclusion of such
evidence did not prejudice defendant's rights. The Court
permitted defendant to testify as to six other instances when
he claimed the prosecutrix lied. See transcript pages 68
to 78. The striking of or refusal to permit testimony as to
a seventh instance certainly did not wreck defendant's
strategy or cause him prejudice.
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the

trial court should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General,
GARY L. THEURER,
Assistant Attorney General,

Attorneys for Respondent.
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